

How Smart Is Bluetooth Smart?

Mike Ryan
iSEC Partners

ShmooCon 9

Feb 16, 2013

Slides and More Info



hmm,
seems legit

<http://lacklustre.net/bluetooth/>

Outline

- What is Bluetooth Smart / Low Energy / BTLE
- Cool Stuff
- More Cool Stuff
- Conclusion

sniffing
Bluetooth
is
hard

sniffing

Bluetooth LE

is slightly
less hard

What is Bluetooth Smart?

- New modulation and link layer for low-power devices
- Introduced in Bluetooth 4.0 (2010)
- AKA Bluetooth Low Energy / BTLE
- vs classic Bluetooth
 - Incompatible with classic Bluetooth devices
 - PHY and link layer almost completely different
 - High-level protocols the same (L2CAP, ATT)


Where is BTLE?

- Sports devices
- High-end smart phones
- Places you wouldn't expect it




How do we sniff it?

Start at the bottom and work our way up:



Ubertooth Block Diagram



PHY Layer

- GFSK, 1 Mbit/sec, +/- 250 kHz
- 40 channels in 2.4 GHz (37 data)
- Hopping

Hopping

- Hop along 37 data channels
- One data packet per timeslot
- Next channel = (channel + hop increment) mod 37

3 → 10 → 17 → 24 → 31 → 1 → 8 → 15 → ...

hop increment = 7

Capturing Packets

- Configure CC2400
 - Set modulation parameters to match BTLE
 - Tune to proper channel
- Follow connections according to hop pattern
 - Hop increment and hop interval, sniffed from connect packet or recovered in promiscuous mode
- Hand off bits to ARM MCU

Link Layer



Figure 2.1: Link Layer packet format

What we have: Sea of bits

What we want: Start of PDU

What we know: AA

```
10001110111101010101
10011100000100011001
11100100110100011101
```

PHY Layer.. Link Layer..

We converted RF to packets
Now what?

Capturing Packets... To PCAP!

- ubertooth-btle speaks packets
- libpcap → dump raw packet data
- PPI header (similar airodump-ng and kismet)

- Still waiting on a DLT for BTLE
 - Unique identifier for the protocol
 - Really shouldn't make a public release without this

Wireshark Awesomeness

The image displays two side-by-side screenshots of the Wireshark network protocol analyzer interface, showing packet captures for Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) traffic. Both screenshots are filtered by the expression 'btatt'.

Left Screenshot (Packet 520):

- Packet 520:** 44.565491s, 39 bytes on wire (312 bits), 39 bytes captured (312 bits). Protocol: ATT. Info: Read By Type Request, Device Name (0x2a00).
- Packet 523:** 44.634088s, 53 bytes on wire (424 bits), 53 bytes captured (424 bits). Protocol: ATT. Info: Read By Type Response, Attribute Value (544920424c452053656e73667220546167).

Right Screenshot (Packet 523):

- Packet 523:** 44.634088s, 53 bytes on wire (424 bits), 53 bytes captured (424 bits). Protocol: ATT. Info: Read By Type Response, Attribute Value (544920424c452053656e73667220546167).

The interface includes a menu bar (File, Edit, View, Go, Capture, Analyze, Statistics, Telephony, Tools, Internals, Help), a toolbar with various icons, and a packet list pane at the top. The main pane shows the packet details for the selected packet, and the bottom pane shows the raw packet bytes in hexadecimal and ASCII.

Injection

- Pretty much the same as receiving, opposite direction
- Follow the spec!
 - Link layer header
 - Payload data
- Hand that off to Ubertooth
 - Calculate CRC
 - Whiten
- Devil is in the CC2400 details

Faux Slave: Status

→ Demo

→ Demo

↑ Demo

↓ Demo

→ Ubertooth shows up under device scan

→ Does not yet respond to scan requests

→ Master → slave: "What is your name?"

GOOD

IDEA

BAD

IDEA

Good Idea: Using AES-CCM

Custom Key

Bad Idea: Exchange
Protocol

Custom Key Exchange Protocol

- 3 pairing methods
 - Just Works™
 - 6-digit PIN
 - OOB
- “None of the pairing methods provide protection against a passive eavesdropper” -Bluetooth Core Spec

Cracking the TK

confirm
=
AES(**TK**, AES(**TK**, **rand** XOR **p1**) XOR **p2**)

GREEN = we have it
RED = we want it

TK: integer between 0 and 999,999
Just Works™: always 0!

Cracking the TK – With *crackle*

Total time to crack:
< 1 second

And That's It

- You're done
- With the TK, you can derive every other key
- You can capture the LTK exchange

SECURITY = DEAD

Decrypting – With *crackle*

- Yes, crackle does that too!
- crackle will decrypt
 - a PCAP file with a pairing setup
 - a PCAP file with an encrypted session, given an LTK

BTLE Encryption: DEAD

- crackle can...
 - crack the pairing TK
 - decrypt all future communications

- 100% passively

BTLE Encryption: Caveats

- Every session uses a different session key
- Every session uses several nonces

Solution: jam the connection to restart a session

- LTK exchanged once, used many times

Solution: inject LTK_REJECT_IND message

Encryption: Postscript


- Don't rely on Just Works or 6-digit PIN
- OOB is not compromised
- Idea: Implement DH in-band to exchange OOB key

Summary

- BTLE sniffing: following and promiscuous
- BTLE injection: PoC slave on Ubertooth
- Capturing to PCAP
- Wireshark plugins for BTLE and BTSM
- Cracking BTLE pairing
- Decrypting passively intercepted communications

Future Work

- Wireshark capture source → with dragorn
- Flesh out slave on dongle
- Master on dongle
- BTLE stack fuzzer
- SD + battery



It's MY Software and I want it NOW

→ crackle

→ <http://lacklustre.net/projects/crackle/>

→ <git://lacklustre.net/crackle>

→ Ubertooth

→ <http://ubertooth.sourceforge.net/>

→ <git://git.code.sf.net/p/ubertooth/code>

→ libbtbb (Wireshark plugins)

→ <http://libbtbb.sourceforge.net/>

→ <git://git.code.sf.net/p/libbtbb/code>

shmooscon_2013 branch



Thanks

Mike Ossmann
Dominic Spill

Mike Kershaw (dragorn)
#ubertooth on freenode
bluez
Bluetooth SIG
ShmooCon!
iSEC Partners

Thank You

Mike Ryan

iSEC Partners

@mpeg4codec

mikeryan@lacklustre.net

<http://lacklustre.net/>

<http://ubertooth.sf.net/>